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One of the main lines of research in algorithmic fairness in-
volves individual fairness (IF) methods. Individual fairness is
motivated by an intuitive principle I call “similar treatment,”
which requires that similar individuals be treated similarly. IF
offers a precise account of this definition using distance met-
rics to evaluate the similarity of individuals. Proponents of
individual fairness have argued that it gives the correct defi-
nition of algorithmic fairness, and that it should therefore be
preferred to other methods for determining fairness. I argue
that individual fairness cannot serve as a definition of fair-
ness. Moreover, IF methods should not be given priority over
other fairness methods, nor used in isolation from them. To
support these conclusions, I describe four in-principle prob-
lems for individual fairness as a definition and as a method
for ensuring fairness: (1) counterexamples show that similar
treatment (and therefore IF) are insufficient to guarantee fair-
ness; (2) IF methods for learning similarity metrics are at risk
of encoding human implicit bias; (3) IF requires prior moral
judgments, limiting its usefulness as a guide for fairness and
undermining its claim to define fairness; and (4) the incom-
mensurability of relevant moral values makes similarity met-
rics impossible for many tasks. In light of these limitations, I
suggest that individual fairness cannot be a definition of fair-
ness, and instead should be seen as one tool among many for
ameliorating algorithmic bias.
1 Introduction
Algorithmic bias and fairness are becoming increasingly ur-
gent topics as the use of AI and machine learning systems
continues to spread through our society. As a result, research
on algorithmic fairness has been expanding rapidly in the
past few years.
One paradigm in algorithmic fairness research is individ-
ual fairness (IF). Proponents of IF suggest that the intuitive
notion of fairness is expressed by the principle similar treat-
ment: similar individuals should be treated similarly (Dwork
et al. 2012). They attempt to capture this intuitive notion us-
ing distance metrics. They measure how similar individuals
are using one metric, and then measure the way those indi-
viduals are treated using another. Individual fairness requires
that if two individuals are close on the similarity metric, they
be close on the treatment metric.
Proponents of individual fairness (IF) argue that their the-
ory captures the intuitive notion of fairness. Moreover, they
suggest that IF catches types of unfairness that group fair-
ness notions miss. For these reasons, they suggest individ-
ual fairness offers the formal definition of fairness. It should
thereby have pride of place among methods for determining
fairness and detecting bias.
I will argue for two primary claims. First, that individ-
ual fairness is inadequate as a definition of fairness. This is
because similar treatment is insufficient to ensure fairness.
Moreover, IF techniques require antecedent judgments about
fairness, making IF unsuitable to provide a definition of the
concept. Second, I will argue that IF should not be used as
a sole means for determining whether an algorithm is fair,
or for detecting bias. Doing so will be inadequate for ensur-
ing fairness in a variety of circumstances. Instead, IF should
only be considered one among many tools for algorithmic
fairness.
I offer four arguments to support these conclusions:
1. Insufficiency of similar treatment: There are a wide va-
riety of counterexamples to the sufficiency of this princi-
ple for ensuring fairness. This undermines the claim that
similar treatment is the “guiding informal understanding
of fairness” (Friedler, Scheidegger, and Venkatasubrama-
nian 2016, p. 2), and the claim that it “captures” the intu-
itive notion of fairness (Dwork et al. 2012, p. 214). The
insufficiency of similar treatment also suggests IF meth-
ods should not be used in isolation from other fairness
methods.
2. Systematic bias and arbiters: One of the most promis-
ing ways of determining a similarity metric for individual
fairness is to appeal to human arbiters to evaluate similar-
ity of individuals. Arbiters provide feedback on whether
and to what degree individuals are similar, or regarding
whether they have been treated fairly. However, there is
much psychological evidence that humans have system-
atic, implicit biases in judgment. Use of human exemplars
thus suffers from the same difficulties as descriptive deci-
sion theory in economics: the mistakes people make are
not always noisy, but are sometimes the result of system-
atic biases. This also undermines the ability of IF to be
sufficient guard against unfairness.
3. Prior moral judgments: Determining whether individu-
als are relevantly similar requires first determining what
features are relevant to fairness. Which features are task-
relevant, and how they should contribute to similarity
evaluation, depends on relevant moral values. Deter-
mining relevance thus requires making moral judgments
about what fairness requires, prior to determining or mea-
suring similarity. So, similar treatment and IF cannot offer
a non-circular definition of fairness. Moreover, IF offers
inadequate guidance on its own, without appeal to other
fairness judgments.
4. Incommensurability: Some moral values are incommen-
surable: they cannot be evaluated on a common measure,
i.e., they cannot be straightforwardly aggregated or ex-
changed. This is shown by cases involving insensitivity to
sweetening: decisions whose difficulty cannot be allevi-
ated by small-value tiebreakers. If such moral values are
relevant for determining similarity for some task, then this
will make it impossible to represent similarity as a dis-
tance metric.
After offering additional background on individual fair-
ness, I will discuss each of these arguments in turn.
2 Background and related work
Fair machine learning is a growing area of research that
seeks to ameliorate algorithmic bias and promote algorith-
mic fairness. One of the chief aims of the research is to
understand what fairness means in the context of algorith-
mic decision-making. The goal is to define fairness in a way
that captures the intuitive concept with rigorous mathemati-
cal precision. Such a definition can be used as a constraint on
optimizing the accuracy of ML algorithms, allowing practi-
tioners to seek accuracy without having to worry about being
unfair.
2.1 Group fairness
The dominant research approach in fair ML is known as
group fairness (Barocas, Hardt, and Narayanan 2019). This
approach attempts to define fairness in terms of statistical
parity criteria (or conditions) that are imposed on the distri-
butions produced by an algorithm. These criteria typically
require that some form of statistical parity obtain between
the treatment of different social groups by the algorithmic
decision-maker. For instance, one such criterion requires
that an algorithm produces the same false-positive rate for
people from different racial groups. (This particular con-
dition was at issue in ProPublica’s famous criticism of a
risk evaluation system known as COMPAS (Angwin et al.
2016).)
The group fairness paradigm, however, suffers from a
number of problems. A wide variety of group fairness defi-
nitions have been proposed, and there has been little agree-
ment about which is the most promising. None appears suf-
ficient on its own to capture the intuitive notion of fair-
ness (Barocas, Hardt, and Narayanan 2019; Kearns and Roth
2019). Moreover, there are counter-examples to the suffi-
ciency of many of these criteria. These counterexamples are
cases where the parity condition is satisfied by the algorithm
but the decision seems “blatantly unfair” to individuals in-
volved (Dwork et al. 2012; Kearns et al. 2018). Even more
problematically, many of the most promising group fairness
constraints are mutually incompatible: it is impossible to sat-
isfy them at the same time (Chouldechova 2017; Kleinberg,
Mullainathan, and Raghavan 2016).
2.2 Individual fairness
In light of the problems for group fairness, many researchers
have turned to a different paradigm, known as individual
fairness (IF). First proposed by Dwork et al., this research
program takes the essence of fairness to be that similar in-
dividuals should be treated similarly. “We capture fairness
by the principle that any two individuals who are similar
with respect to a particular task should be classified sim-
ilarly (Dwork et al. 2012, p. 214). This definition has been
taken up by a large body of researchers (e.g., Friedler, Schei-
degger, and Venkatasubramanian 2016; Joseph et al. 2016;
Kearns and Roth 2019; Kearns, Roth, and Wu 2017; Ilvento
2020; Gillen et al. 2018; Mukherjee et al. 2020; Wang et al.
2019) Call this principle similar treatment. It is related to
Aristotelian consistency principles, familiar from ethics and
philosophy of law, which require that like cases be treated
alike (Binns 2020). Proponents of individual fairness con-
sider similar treatment to be the intuitive definition of fair-
ness. They seek to offer a precise mathematical treatment of
the principle.
Following Dwork et al., individual fairness is typically
precisely defined using two distance metrics. The first is a
similarity metric: a distance metric that measures the degree
of similarity between individuals. The second is function
that measures the difference in the chances two individu-
als face of obtaining the outcomes of the decision at issue.
Individual fairness then requires that the distance between
two individuals’ outcomes is no greater than their distance
according to the similarity metric. Following most of the lit-
erature on IF I will appeal to the original formulation from
(Dwork et al. 2012).1
Dwork et al. use a function called a Lipschitz mapping to
give a precise rendering of similar treatment:
Individual Fairness (IF): A mapping M : V → ∆(A) sat-
isfies the (D, d)-Lipschitz property if for every x, y ∈ V ,
we have:
D(Mx,My) ≤ d(x, y) (1)
Here, x, y ∈ V are individuals. In most applications relevant
to the fair ML literature, V is a set of individual people.
M is a function that assigns, to individuals, a probability
distribution over the outcomes A. D is distance function that
measures the difference in the probabilities. The similarity
metric is represented by d.
What IF says, then, is that the distance between the
chances of certain outcomes assigned to two individuals
(i.e., the similarity of treatment) must be no greater than the
1Dwork and Ilvento (2018) offer an updated version of the orig-
inal Lipschitz condition. There are other variations (Kearns and
Roth 2019; Kearns, Roth, and Wu 2017; Friedler, Scheidegger, and
Venkatasubramanian 2016), but the differences are largely irrele-
vant to our discussion, with a few notable exceptions to be dis-
cussed below in sections 2.4 and 3.4.
similarity-distance between the individuals (i.e., the similar-
ity of individuals). It essentially works by measuring simi-
larity of individuals and similarity of outcomes, represent-
ing these two measurements in a similar format (as similarly
scaled distance metrics), and constraining how far apart they
can be. This requires that both distance measures have real-
valued output. This is made easier for the outcome-distance
D by the fact that the output of M is a probability. Dwork
et al. offer several acceptable distance measures for compar-
ing the chances of outcomes, including statistical distance
(Dwork et al. 2012, p. 5). Our focus will be on the similar-
ity distance metric. Note that this is required to be a metric
in the precise mathematical sense by most IF research (e.g.,
(Ilvento 2020; Gillen et al. 2018)).2
We can get a sense of how this works through an example.
Suppose an algorithm M is being used for college admis-
sions decisions. M offers a “soft” prediction, giving a prob-
ability that an applicant should be admitted. Suppose two
applicants, x and y are very similar: they have similar GPAs
and SAT scores and come from the same high school. y is
from a less wealthy family. But this fact is not considered
relevant to determining who should be admitted (given cer-
tain background assumptions about ethics), so the similarity
metric ignores it. Thus, the distance between the applicants
is very small, d(x, y) ≈ .01. However, M assigns applicant
x a score of .9, and applicant y a score of .7. (We can imag-
ine it is sensitive to family wealth since it was trained on
historical admissions data). According to the statistical dis-
tance metric suggested by Dwork et al., D(Mx,My) = .2
in this case. Thus, M would be considered (individually) un-
fair: it fails to respect the Lipschitz constraint. Applicant x
and y are treated dis-similarly, despite being similar.
This example illustrates the intuitive appeal of individual
fairness. Irrelevant differences between people should not
lead to significant differences in their chance of a good out-
come. There is no good justification for treating the two can-
didates differently. Similar treatment is meant to explain this
intuitive judgment, and IF is meant to give a mathematically
precise rendition of that principle.
The example also shows a feature of IF that is important
for understanding some of the problems it faces: what counts
as a task-relevant similarity or difference depends on moral
judgment. In the example, I suggested that family wealth
was not relevant to determining who should be admitted.
This claim depends on a moral judgment that it would be
unfair to consider family wealth in determining who is ad-
mitted. This is an essential feature, as IF is designed to be a
kind of fairness that doesn’t require ignoring the fact that in-
dividuals are members of protected groups. Indeed, another
name for individual fairness is “fairness through awareness”,
the title of Dwork et al.’s initializing paper. However, the
2Dwork et al. (2012) always refer to d as a metric, and appeal
to the triangle inequality condition in their proofs. However, they
suggest in a footnote that d does not need to be a full similarity
metric for all of their purposes. Subsequent work has continued
to rely on the similarity metric being a metric, e.g., (Gillen et al.
2018; Dwork et al. 2020; Ilvento 2020). I follow that usage here.
Bechavod, Jung, and Wu (2020) is a notable exception, to be dis-
cussed below in section 3.4.
only way to ensure that being aware of protected differences
leads to fairness is for fairness to inform the similarity met-
ric. I will return to this point below (section 3.3).
2.3 Arguments for individual fairness
Proponents offer two main arguments for individual fairness
as a theory of fairness. The first argument concerns the in-
tuitive appeal of individual fairness and similar treatment.
As already discussed, they suggest that the intuitive cases
show that similar treatment is the right definition of fairness,
and that IF captures this principle in precise mathematical
terms. In support of this, they also argue that group fairness
is misguided precisely because it concerns protections for
groups rather than for individuals. Fairness just is about how
individuals are treated, they suggest, and so group fairness
takes the wrong target of consideration. Kearns and Roth
make this explicit: “... both statistical parity and equality of
false negatives are providing protections for groups (in this
case the two races), but not for specific individuals in those
groups...” (Kearns and Roth 2019).
The second argument offered for individual fairness is
that it forbids a variety of common discriminatory practices.
Dwork et al. suggest that imposing the Lipshitz condition
on algorithms will forbid actions such as blatant explicit dis-
crimination, implicit discrimination (using redundant encod-
ing), housing redlining and reverse redlining, and tokenism
(Dwork et al. 2012, p. 22). More importantly, proponents ar-
gue that IF can successfully detect and prevent types of dis-
crimination that various group fairness criteria miss. These
include cases of “cherry-picking”, where members of sensi-
tive groups are randomly chosen, or are chosen for malicious
reasons as a way of undermining members of that group
(Dwork et al. 2012, p. 7–8). For instance, consider a col-
lege admissions task where statistical parity between racial
groups is ensured by carefully vetting the majority group
applicants, while randomly selecting a proportionate num-
ber of applicants from a minority group. This seems intu-
itively unfair (particularly to hard-working members of the
minority group who are not admitted). However, it would be
compatible with a variety of group fairness criteria. IF, by
contrast, forbids this kind of cherry-picking.
In what follows I raise four objections to individual fair-
ness. These objections support my contention that IF can-
not serve as a definition of fairness, or entirely replace other
forms of fairness evaluation. These objections undermine
the strength of the arguments in favor of IF, while also rais-
ing worries for the breadth of its applicability. However, note
that I will not argue that the methods developed by propo-
nents of IF should be abandoned. Ultimately, I think that
these methods will be useful as one kind of tool among many
needed to promote fair machine learning. But I argue that
this method has a more limited scope of application than its
proponents suggest, and should not be seen as a replacement
for other fairness methods.
2.4 Related individual fairness research
There are a few alternative lines of research that do not
appeal to similarity metrics, broadly speaking, fall within
the individual fairness research program. Each of these pro-
grams has distinct issues that must be addressed. Joseph
et al. (2016) and Kearns, Roth, and Wu (2017) offer a ver-
sion of individual fairness that focuses on ensuring that in-
dividuals with greater merit always do better than those with
less merit. However, this method has a serious drawback.
Specifically, the distribution of merit in actual societies is af-
fected by existing oppressive structures in society. A method
that focuses on it will thereby be likely to reproduce the
kinds of biases algorithmic fairness is meant to ameliorate.
In any case, merit-based IF differs significantly from the
kind of similarity metric-based IF that is the main focus of
this paper.
Yurochkin, Bower, and Sun (2020) offer a promising IF
method that requires algorithms be insensitive to perturba-
tion along protected dimensions. Their method requires that
algorithms provide the same results for an individual even if
their sensitive features are changed. In other words, it should
give the same results to two individuals with identical fea-
tures except for differences in protected class, e.g., race, gen-
der, etc. However, this method gives up on the benefits of the
“awareness” aspect of individual fairness. One of the sig-
nificant benefits suggested for IF is that it allows “fairness
through awareness”, (the title of the initializing paper of the
research program (Dwork et al. 2012)). That the IF similar-
ity metric is aware of individual’s sensitive features is nec-
essary to handle cases involving corrective fairness goals (as
in the affirmative action case below in section 3.3). Requir-
ing insensitivity to perturbation makes it impossible to count
such cases as fair, and so gives up on one of the main bene-
fits of awareness. Weighing that drawback against the other
benefits of their method is beyond the scope of this paper.
Related criticisms of IF Johnson and Jordan (2018) for-
malize Aristotelian consistency, which they call the Like
Cases Maxim (LCM), using a distance metric to character-
ize likeness. This formalization of LCM is highly analogous
to similarity metrics for IF. They argue that the application
of LCM to individual legal cases has pernicious results. For
instance, LCM forbids sharp cutoffs like important age re-
strictions (e.g., driving age). Johnson and Jordan also note
that plausible weakenings of LCM, ones that don’t use sim-
ilarity metrics, make the principle too weak to be helpful in
promoting justice. Given how similar this formalization is to
IF, Johnson and Jordan’s cases provide complementary wor-
ries to the ones I raise here for IF.
3 Problems for Individual Fairness
In this section I present the four arguments against individ-
ual fairness introduced above. Each provides reason to doubt
that individual fairness provides a definition of fairness that
captures the intuitive notion. Moreover, they provide reason
to doubt that IF methods should be deployed without also
appealing to other algorithmic fairness methods. For each
problem, I will also discuss potential responses.
3.1 Insufficiency of Similar Treatment
The first issue I will raise for individual fairness concerns
its adequacy as a definition of fairness. In particular, I will
argue for the insufficiency of similar treatment as a definition
of fairness. This undermines the intuitive case for IF, insofar
as it relies on the idea that similar treatment is the notion
which captures fairness.
The argument against the sufficiency of similar treatment
is straightforward. If similar treatment is the right definition
of fairness, then no cases in which similar treatment is satis-
fied should be unfair. However, it is easy to generate coun-
terexamples to this claim. There are many cases in which
similar individuals are treated similarly, but where the out-
come is clearly unfair.
Universal Rejection Consider a system that offers ad-
vice on college admissions decisions. In this case, the
system simply recommends denying every application.
Here, similar individuals are treated similarly, because
everyone is treated similarly: everyone is denied admis-
sion. Despite this, individuals who have the ability to
succeed in college, but who are denied the opportunity,
can rightly complain that the situation is unfair.
High Risk Consider a system that assigns scores to in-
dividuals designed to measure their risk of recidivism
(much like the notorious COMPAS system (Angwin
et al. 2016)). This system is designed to satisfy IF, so
that individuals who are relevantly similar are given
similar risk scores. However, after setting it up, as-
sume its creators adjust the system so that everyone is
given the same, significant increase in risk score. The
adjusted system treats everyone as a much higher risk
than before it was adjusted. Here again, every similar
individual is treated similarly, but everyone is treated
as riskier without any justification.
These examples illustrate the recipe for creating coun-
terexamples to the sufficiency of similar treatment. We can
generate counterexamples using arbitrary changes applied
to each individual considered by the algorithm. What is re-
quired is a change that is applied equally to all individuals,
and one which involves worsening the outcomes for each
of them. Crucially, this will involve an arbitrary, unjustified
change, one that it would seem reasonable for each individ-
ual to reject as unfair.
In cases created with this recipe, similar treatment is satis-
fied, but the situation is unfair. Thus, similar treatment can-
not capture the intuitive essence of fairness: it is not the def-
inition of fairness. This undermines the intuitive argument
for individual fairness as the primary way of evaluating fair-
ness. The fact that IF is a formal characterization of similar
treatment is not enough to show that IF is the right formal
definition of fairness, one that is superior to other fairness
criteria. The fact that IF encodes similar treatment does not
show that IF is better than, or should have pride of place
over, other proposed fairness criteria, as similar treatment is
not the definition of fairness. At best, similar treatment is a
necessary condition for fairness. This is not enough to show
that IF should displace or supersede other fairness criteria.
Responses to insufficiency I do not know of any response
attempting to show the sufficiency of similar treatment for
fairness, in light of the counterexamples. Nor do I think it
would be possible to do so. Moreover, similar treatment is
a type of Aristotelian consistency principle (Binns 2020). It
has been noted before that such principles are at best neces-
sary conditions for justice (see, e.g., Frankena 1966; Schauer
2018; Johnson and Jordan 2018; Hart, Hart, and Green 2012;
Rawls 1971).
3.2 Systematic bias and arbiters
One of the primary issues that has stymied research into in-
dividual fairness is the difficulty of finding appropriate sim-
ilarity metrics (Binns 2020; Ilvento 2020; Mukherjee et al.
2020). This is more difficult than proponents of IF initially
realized (partially for the reasons discussed in section 3.3).
However, recently there have been new attempts at using
machine learning to derive appropriate metrics. One of the
most promising directions for learning metrics involves ap-
peal to human decision-makers as experts or “arbiters” in
making similarity and fairness judgments. (Ilvento 2020)
appeal to human arbiters in evaluating whether individuals
are relevantly similar, and learn a similarity metric based on
those judgments. Similarly, Mukherjee et al. appeal to two
methods for metric learning using data consisting of “human
feedback, hand-picked groups of similar training examples,
hand-crafted examples that should be treated similarly as ob-
served training examples, or a combination of the above,”
(Mukherjee et al. 2020, p. 3). Wang et al. (2019), Lahoti,
Gummadi, and Weikum (2019), and Gillen et al. (2018) of-
fer similar attempts to learn metrics from data.3
Using judgments of human arbiters is a promising idea. It
is commonplace in moral philosophy to appeal to people’s
judgments or intuitions regarding particular cases. These in-
tuitions are typically treated as defeasible evidence that must
be accommodated or explained away by a moral theory. The
idea is that human judges will be reliable at recognizing sim-
ilarity, fairness, and unfairness, even if they are not capable
of articulating a theory of fairness. Ilvento (2020), Gillen
et al. (2018), and Mukherjee et al. (2020) all explicitly ap-
peal to similar ideas of “knowing it when you see it.” More-
over, there is a long history (particularly in virtue ethics)
of appealing to virtuous agents as exemplars to help guide
action. It is highly plausible that human judges will be sen-
sitive to the moral considerations that must be respected in
determining what makes two individuals similar for the pur-
pose of a particular task. Thus, use of human arbiters offers a
good chance of reflecting the prior moral judgments needed
for determining a fair similarity metric.
Despite the apparent promise of the project, the appeal to
human arbiters to learn a similarity metric suffers from a dif-
ficulty stemming from human biases. It is well-known that
humans exhibit pernicious, discriminatory biases in their
judgments. Moreover, these biases need not be explicit. A
large body of psychological research collected over the past
3Bechavod, Jung, and Wu (2020) also appeal to human arbiters
(in their parlance “auditors”) in pursuit of individual fairness. Un-
like other attempts, however, they do not require that the similarity
measure be a distance metric. While this seems promising, it does
not escape the issue of systematic bias I will raise for attempts to
learn similarity metrics.
five decades provides significant evidence that human judg-
ment and decision-making suffer from systematic biases
that individuals are not aware of (Kahneman 2011; Brown-
stein 2019; Gawronski and Brannon 2019; Greenwald and
Krieger 2006). Much of this bias concerns rational belief and
decision-making quite generally, e.g., failures to respect ba-
sic principles of probability and rational choice (Tversky and
Kahneman 1974). The evidence of these biases have raised
significant difficulties for using classical decision-theory for
descriptive purposes in economics. And unfortunately, these
implicit and systematic biases are not limited to prudential
rationality. Implicit bias is a significant factor in perpetuat-
ing oppressive structures involving race, gender, and other
sensitive categories.4
Proponents of the human arbiter approach appeal to the
idea that aggregating the judgments of a large enough group
of arbiters would be sufficient to limit error. This makes
sense on the assumption that there is an underlying fact of
the matter about similarity, and that human judgments are
noisy proxies for this underlying similarity relation. How-
ever, if human judgments are systematically biased, rather
than merely noisy, then this bias won’t be washed out aggre-
gating larger sets of judgments. This problem is essentially
the same issue that the heuristics and biases literature raised
for classical microeconomics (Kahneman 2011). Attempts
to learn a similarity metric from biased human judgments
runs the risk of exacerbating algorithmic bias, rather than
ameliorating it. That human bias might infect the similarity
metric is particularly problematic given that one of the main
goals of fair machine learning is to help ameliorate bias.
Human judgment is unavoidable when engaging in ethi-
cal theorizing. Our intuitive moral judgments invariably and
inescapably serve as part of our evidence for ethical theo-
ries. The problem of systematic bias faced by attempts to
learn fair similarity metrics are thus not novel to the IF re-
search program. Appeal to intuition in normative ethics suf-
fers from the same worries. In that field, philosophers typ-
ically use a variety of evidence to evaluate and adjudicate
intuitive judgments, including how well the judgments co-
here with accepted moral principles, and the best available
moral theories. This method is called reflective equilibrium
(Rawls 1971).5
The crucial point about systematic bias is that it should
make us wary of treating individual fairness as the sole or
4There is much debate about the extent and importance of im-
plicit bias, but recent metastudies suggest that it is a well-confirmed
effect (Brownstein 2019). Some philosophers and psychologists
have argued that the data meant to support the idea of implicit bias
is explainable in terms of undetected explicit biases, perhaps in-
volving test subjects refusal to admit explicit biases. However, this
explanation offers no solace to the proponent of IF. Secret explicit
biases would be just as effective at imparting pernicious discrimi-
nation into a similarity metric as genuinely implicit biases.
5As a theory about philosophical methodology, reflective equi-
librium has wide but certainly not universal acceptance (Daniels
2020). Detractors, however, typically appeal to some alternative
way of evaluating intuitive judgments. Few advocate completely
ignoring such judgments, and even fewer advocate complete fi-
delity to them.
primary arbiter of fairness. If proponents are successful in
developing methods for learning similarity metrics from hu-
man judgment for particular tasks, I should ensure that any
use of an IF criteria built from such metrics is paired with
other fairness evaluation methods. One clear benefit of group
fairness statistical criteria is that they will be sensitive to
algorithmic biases that emerge only in the aggregate, ones
which may be inherited unnoticed by similarity metrics used
for individual fairness criteria.
Responses to systematic bias problems Researchers
working on learning similarity metrics are appropriately
concerned with the difficulty of building a similarity met-
ric for fairness. They appeal to human arbiters given the fact
that human judgments are essential as evidence and guid-
ance regarding fairness. These IF researchers are sensitive
to the worry that humans might be unable to accurately an-
swer the kinds of difficult questions being asked them (for
instance, see Ilvento 2020, Sec. 1.7). They are also sensi-
tive to worries about moral disagreement (e.g., see Mukher-
jee et al. 2020, Sec. 2). To my knowledge, however, there
is no explicit consideration of worries about implicit bias.
The best candidate for help with correcting for learned im-
plicit bias would be to pair IF methods with other fairness
criteria, like the group fairness statistical parity criteria, as
in Dwork et al. (2012) and Zemel et al. (2013). Group fair-
ness criteria will be less prone to implicit bias than learned
metrics (though not immune). Using the two kinds of meth-
ods together may offer improved protection by increasing
the chance of catching the bias.
3.3 Prior moral judgments
The third problem I will raise for individual fairness also
concerns its adequacy as a definition of fairness. Moreover,
it suggests that finding an accurate similarity metric may
be even more difficult than has been understood. The prob-
lem stems from the fact that the similarity metric needed
for IF depends on prior moral judgments concerning task-
relevance and the moral values in question.
One of the arguments for individual fairness is that it rules
out certain kinds of unfair cases that group fairness criteria
permit. In order for IF to work this way, or for any purpose,
it requires the practitioner to know the similarity metric d.
That is, we must know a function that assigns to each pair of
individuals a distance between them, represented by a real
number. In order for IF to accurately represent fairness for
a task, by the lights of IF’s proponents, this similarity met-
ric must accurately reflect the task-relevant similarities and
differences among individuals.
As noted above, the similarity metric must be sensitive to
moral features of the task and of the individuals, in addition
to the relevant descriptive features. This fact was recognized
by Dwork et al. (2012, p. 3), who suggest that metrics must
be adjusted in a way agreed upon by members of society
(this idea, of agreement as a way of determining politically
acceptable moral facts, is taken from Rawls (2001)).
A pair of examples will help show the importance of
moral judgments to building an accurate similarity metric
for the purposes of fairness. I will continue appealing to col-
lege admissions as a useful kind of task for our examples.
Discriminatory Admissions A system M is used to
assist decisions concerning admissions for a university.
Its task is to select successful students: those who are
likely to graduate, obtain high GPAs, promote univer-
sity reputation via extra-curricular activities, and ob-
tain subsequent employment. M is trained on histori-
cal data from the university’s admissions committee’s
decisions, learning to mimic past human decisions. In
the data, white applicants were admitted at higher rates
than black applicants. M thus learns a preference for
white applicants and admits them at higher rates even
where other features are equivalent. This turns out to
be highly accurate for the task of choosing successful
students: the university environment is filled with im-
plicit and explicit racism that negatively impacts black
students’ success.
Affirmative Action M is being used for a different
university. As before, it is used to assist admissions
decisions with a goal of selecting students who will
be successful. It is again trained on historical data.
This university aims to promote diversity and uses var-
ious methods of affirmative action. For instance, it adds
some points to black applicants’ SAT scores, in light of
potential bias in the test itself, and the fact that students
from this group typically have less access to test prepa-
ration. Thus, M learns to admit more black applicants
for this university.
I think it is clear that these two cases are morally very dif-
ferent. Even if you are unconvinced that affirmative action
is permissible, the second case is clearly better than the dis-
criminatory admissions case, which involves continuing op-
pression of a marginalized group. However, both cases can
be interpreted as “treating similar people similarly.” Both
involve taking into consideration racial differences that are
relevant to the success of M at achieving its task. Moreover,
in both cases, one can construct a similarity metric d that
would satisfy the Lipschitz condition and (formally) satisfy
individual fairness. In the former case, race is used as a re-
liable predictor of student success. In the latter, it is used
to promote diversity in the student body (and potentially re-
dress historical injustice). In both cases, race is a feature that
d is sensitive to, a feature that makes for greater differences
between individuals. Intuitively, one of these uses of race as
a reason for dissimilar treatment is unacceptable, and one of
them is acceptable (or at least better).
This illustrates a crucial feature of individual fairness: it
requires antecedent moral judgments about which proper-
ties and relations of individuals are morally task-relevant.
Building the similarity metric d requires moral judgments
about what kinds of differences are morally acceptable to
treat as task relevant, and which ones are not. The only way
to distinguish between the acceptable use of race as a fea-
ture in affirmative action and the morally unacceptable use
in discriminatory admissions is to make a substantive moral
judgment. To put it another way, treating similar individuals
similarly requires appeal to substantive ethical claims about
who counts as similar. Neither similar treatment nor its pre-
cisification into individual fairness offers guidance on how
to make such moral judgments.
Moreover, this feature of individual fairness is not a mi-
nor side note: it is crucial to the way IF promotes “fairness
through awareness.” Using sensitive or protected features
like race, gender, lgbtq+ status, etc. is essential to how IF
is supposed to deliver fairness. It’s well-known that attempts
to achieve fairness through unawareness does not work in a
wide variety of cases (Barocas, Hardt, and Narayanan 2019).
When systems are designed that do not have access to the
sensitive features, they will still reproduce bias through a
number of means, including using proxies for the sensitive
features (Johnson 2020). One of IF’s chief virtues is the way
it is attempts to solve this problem.
Our affirmative action case shows how prior moral judg-
ments are necessary for IF to help promote fairness through
awareness. An appropriate similarity metric, d, for the task
in affirmative action will treat a white applicant x with an
SAT of 1400 as relevantly similar to a black applicant y with
a score of 1250. In other words, d(x, y) will be small. The
similarity metric treats individuals with these differences as
similar. Building the right similarity metric here requires
making the judgment that this kind of sensitivity to racial
categories is morally permissible. Making such moral judg-
ments in building d is a necessary feature for allowing IF
to promote fairness through awareness. In contrast, the kind
of sensitivity to moral categories shown in discriminatory
admissions is impermissible. But nothing about similarity,
simpliciter, does this work.
The necessity of making moral judgments in building a
similarity metric is another factor that undermines the in-
tuitive argument for individual fairness. Similar treatment
is purported to be the right definition of fairness, one that
offers guidance on achieving fairness. IF is supposed to
be preferable to group fairness notions because it encodes
similar treatment, a principle which is supposed to capture
the essence of the pre-theoretic, intuitive notion of fairness.
Similar treatment and IF are purported to be informative,
non-circular definitions of fairness. However, similar treat-
ment and IF cannot deliver on this promise of offering guid-
ance, or on avoiding circularity. This is because they rely on
antecedent moral judgments about what features it would be
fair to treat as relevant to determining similarity. Instead of
giving us guidance on fairness for a task, IF relies on our
having prior knowledge of what is fair.
For the reasons noted in the last section, similar treatment
presents at most a necessary condition on fairness. Neces-
sary conditions, however, are not always informative. Being
born on Earth is (at least at the moment) a necessary con-
dition on being accepted to college, but this does not tell
us very much about who will be admitted. Similar treatment
and IF are meant to provide guidance on what fairness is and
what it requires. If we don’t know what the fair thing to do
is, IF purports to tell us. As we have seen, however, it doesn’t
offer as much independent guidance as it is supposed to. In-
stead, it requires prior moral judgments about what features
are fair to consider for a task. The required similarity metric
cannot be constructed before we know this.
To be clear, this reliance on prior fairness judgments does
not show that similar treatment and IF are false as princi-
ples. Nor does it suggest that we should abandon individ-
ual fairness as a method for assessing fairness. IF might still
represent a useful way of aggregating information about fair-
ness judgments. What it does undermine is the idea that IF is
the definition of fairness, one with pride of place over other
kinds of fairness criteria in virtue of its derivation from the
fundamental or essential nature of fairness. Similar treat-
ment, as we have seen, is at best a necessary principle of
fairness. Moreover, it is one that depends for its content on
antecedent fairness judgments. For these reasons, it cannot
be the definition of fairness. Nor can IF serve as the singular
or primary method for assessing fairness.
The problem presented here is not novel to individual
fairness in machine learning. Similar treatment is a type of
Aristotelian consistency principle, as Binns (2020) notes.
Consistency principles of this sort have been appealed to in
both philosophical ethics and the law. Typically, they are ex-
pressed as the requirement that “like cases be treated alike.”
For such requirements, the same kind of issue has arisen:
they offer little in the way of the guidance needed to deter-
mine when two situations are alike. This has been called the
problem of emptiness. Aristotelian consistency principles
are “merely formal”: they require substantive moral com-
mitments about what it means for two cases to be relevantly
alike. They are empty from the perspective of action guid-
ance. In contemporary philosophical ethics, this issue has
been since at least (Frankena 1966). Schauer (2018) makes
a similar point regarding consistency principles governing
judges’ decisions in legal cases. It might be true that cases
which involve the same issues should be given the same ver-
dicts; but what it means for two cases to be the same is pre-
cisely what is at issue in most disputes on the subject. The
principle thus offers little guidance.
The issues I have raised here for individual fairness in-
volve the same deep issue for consistency principles. In ad-
dition to undermining the intuitive case for treating IF as
the pre-eminent definition of fairness, this helps explain the
difficulties researchers have faced in learning similarity met-
rics. Knowing that one is looking to account for similarities
is not enough to develop such a metric; one must also be
sensitive to particular moral judgments. This also suggests
that similarity metrics developed for other purposes will of-
ten not be suitable for use in individual fairness evaluation.
For instance, Dwork et al. (2012, p. 3) suggest that a sim-
ilarity metric could be found from a system for diagnosing
cardiology patients, the Advanced Analytics for Information
Management project.6 However, this project is unlikely to
include the moral fairness judgments required for building
the kind of similarity metric needed for individual fairness.
Responses to prior moral judgment worries Dwork
et al. (2012) suggest that, in the absence of knowledge of
the real similarity metric, a metric can be constructed using
“the ‘best’ available approximation as agreed upon by so-
ciety” (p. 214), and cite Rawls (2001) as inspiration. This
6For details about this project, see https://web.archive.org/web/
20120209000934/http://www.almaden.ibm.com/cs/projects/aalim/
suggests a recognition that moral judgments must be made
in order to build a similarity metric. Research into learning
fairness metrics, such as (Gillen et al. 2018), Ilvento (2020),
Mukherjee et al. (2020) (discussed above in section 3.2) also
shows awareness of the importance of prior fairness judg-
ments in building similarity metrics. However, these works
have not given arguments defending the non-circularity and
informativeness of similar treatment and IF in light of their
dependence on prior moral judgments.
A potential response would be to highlight the usefulness
of the similarity metric as an aggregation of the prior moral
judgments about fairness. This aggregation response con-
cedes that the prior moral judgments are explanatorily prior
to IF. It thus does not defend IF as a definition of fairness.
However, it does offer a role for IF, and so it defends against
the objection that IF is unhelpful or empty of advice. On this
view, IF does offer advice about avoiding unfairness. While
it’s true that doing so requires appeal to prior fairness judg-
ments, once those judgments are made the similarity metric
helpfully aggregates them, and the Lipschitz condition helps
identify cases of unfairness. This response seems promis-
ing, and fits well with the research program into learning
similarity metrics from human arbiters discussed in the last
paragraph. However, it will only work for tasks where there
is a coherent metric to be built. In section 3.4, I discuss why,
for many tasks, there will fail to be a similarity metric.
3.4 Incommensurability
As I have argued, an accurate similarity metric requires
prior moral judgments about what kinds of similarities are
task-relevant. These moral judgments must accurately track
moral values.7 This raises another worry for developing ac-
curate similarity metrics. The moral values in question must
be commensurable in order for them to be combined into a
similarity metric. That is, the existence of a similarity metric
requires that it be possible to aggregate the moral values, or
evaluate them together, in a straightforward way. Crucially,
this straightforward aggregation must allow for tradeoffs be-
tween the values. However, philosophers have argued that a
variety of moral values are incommensurable with one an-
other, meaning they cannot be aggregated in terms of a com-
mon measure (Hsieh 2016; Chang 2015). If the values rele-
vant for a particular task are incommensurable, it will be im-
possible to construct a real-valued similarity metric as used
by proponents of individual fairness.
Incommensurability is a relation between two (or more)
values. Two values are incommensurable iff there is no com-
mon measure that can be applied to both values. Basically,
values are incommensurable if there is no way of exchanging
7All of the points in this paper are compatible with a variety of
metaethical views about the nature of moral judgments and moral
values (Sayre-McCord 2014). For instance, even expressivists will
agree that there can be inaccurate moral judgments: those that
do not actually express the emotions, intentions, or plans of the
speaker. Moreover, one need not be committed to moral realism
about the relevant values here to recognize the incommensurabil-
ity worries I raise in this section, as incommensurabilty and par-
ity cases arise even for individual preferences in decision-making
(Hsieh 2016; Chang 2005).
or trading them off in a predictable, straightforward manner.
This point was historically raised as a problem for descrip-
tive decision theory, where the common measure at issue
was money. However, the same point will apply to other
measures, particularly those which can be represented by
real-values like similarity metrics.
One way for values to be incommensurable is as a result
of incomparability. Incomparability is a relation that holds
between bearers of value, i.e., things that have value. Bear-
ers of value include actions, choices, outcomes, or individ-
uals. The sense of “comparable” relevant here means able
to be compared.8 Two items are comparable if they bear a
comparative relation to one another. According to the tra-
ditional view, known as the trichotomy thesis, there are ex-
actly three comparative relations: better than, worse than,
and equally good relations (Chang 2002). For instance, if
you prefer the taste of chocolate to the taste of prunes, then
the action eating chocolate is better than eating prunes in
terms of your gustatory values. Thus, the two actions are
comparable. The trichotomy thesis entails that the only way
for a rational agent (with full knowledge of her options) to
have no preference between two comparable choices is if
the choices are equally good. If a person knows all about
the relative tastiness of chocolate and prunes, yet she has no
preference between the two, then the two choices must be
equally good (in terms of taste) to her.
Traditional decision theory assumes the trichotomy the-
sis, and assumes that all of an agent’s choices are compara-
ble (Schoenfield 2014). These assumptions are necessary for
representing an agent’s values using a utility function. Util-
ity functions assign a real number value to outcomes, repre-
senting how much the agent values that outcome. In a utility
function, the better than relation is represented by >, worse
than by <, and equally good by =. Every pair of real num-
bers x, y is related by exactly one of the relations {>,<,=}.
Moreover, if it’s not the case that x > y and it’s not the case
that y > x, then x = y. As a result, if an agent’s values are
accurately represented by the real numbers that are output
by a utility function, the only way for the agent to have no
preference between two options is for them to have equal
value. In other words, the agent must view them as equally
good. If there is at least one pair of options to which none of
the three relations apply, then there can be no utility function
describing the agent. The Similarity metrics used for IF also
involve a function with a real number as output. A similar
issue arises for similarity metrics, for similar reasons, to be
discussed shortly.
To illustrate the problem of incommensurable moral val-
ues we can consider cases of insensitivity to sweetening
(De Sousa 1974; Chang 2002; Hsieh 2016). In such cases,
an agent has difficulty choosing between two options, and
small improvements in either choice do not seem to help
8Sometimes “comparable” is used to mean similar by individ-
ual fairness researchers (Yurochkin, Bower, and Sun 2020). That is
not what I mean here. There is also some dispute in the philosophi-
cal literature regarding the terms “incommensurable” and “incom-
parable”. I follow the usage suggested by Chang (2015) and Hsieh
(2016). I focus on incommensurability that arises as a result of in-
comparability and Chang’s notion of parity (2002).
them make up their mind.
Hard career choice After finishing her Ph.D, Adele
must choose between option A, a job for a non-profit
charity, or option B, a job as an assistant professor.
Working as an academic would allow her to do research
and teach, both of which she thinks are morally valu-
able. Working at the charity would allow her to alle-
viate people’s suffering and enact solidarity with oth-
ers, both of which she again thinks are valuable. Adele
finds herself having difficulty choosing. Both options
concern moral values she cares about, and she is uncer-
tain which choice would be better. Finally, in order to
help break the tie, Joseph offers Adele twenty dollars if
she takes the professor job.
What this case illustrates is that hard choices, in which the
agent has no clear preference between the two options, are
not always cases where the options are equally good. Intu-
itively, it would be perfectly reasonable for Adele to remain
undecided between the options, even after one of them has
been “sweetened” with a small improvement. Cases like this
one are common, so even if this case does not elicit your in-
tuition that Adele is rational, it is likely there are other cases
of hard choices that do seem rational.
Cases of insensitivity to sweetening, like hard career
choice, show that even if a rational agent does not have a
preference between options A and B, it is sometimes still
rational for her to have no preference between A + $20 and
B. This is true even assuming she prefers A + $20 to A.
For these preferences to be rational, either A and B must
be incomparable, or the trichotomy thesis must be false. Ei-
ther way, some of Adele’s values must be incommensurable.
There will be no way to build a utility function that accu-
rately represents her values in this case.
Another way to see the problem posed by this case in-
volves the condition of negative transitivity. This condition
requires that for any three options O1, O2, O3, if an agent
does not prefer O1 to O2, and they do not prefer O2 to O3,
then they must not prefer O1 to O3. An agent must satisfy
negative transitivity in order for there to be a utility function
that represents her preferences. This is again because utility
functions use real numbers to represent values, which nec-
essarily satisfy negative transitivity for {<,>,=}. Adele’s
preferences in this case fail to exhibit negative transitivity.
She does not prefer A + $20 to B, she does not prefer B
and A, but she does prefer A+ $20 to A. So there can be no
utility function that represents her.
Insensitivity to sweetening cases show that either the tri-
chotomy thesis is false or that the choices are incomparable.
Chang (2002) argues that we should reject the trichotomy
thesis, and instead recognize a fourth relation she calls par-
ity. Broome (1997), in contrast, argues that we can maintain
the trichotomy thesis by recognizing that comparability is a
vague concept, and that sweetening cases involve indetermi-
nately comparable values. The results of this dispute won’t
concern us. The existence of either incomparability, parity,
or indeterminacy between choices in these cases is sufficient
for incommensurability between the values in question.
There are insensitivity to sweetening cases which pose di-
rect problems for building a similarity metric for individual
fairness applications. Consider a case involving college ad-
missions once again.
Hard admissions choice The admissions committee
for Fancy New England University is meeting to de-
cide between two candidates for admission, Bridget
and Claire. The committee is seeking to promote moral
values such as student success, intellectual achieve-
ment, a nurturing community, diversity, etc. Bridget has
a 3.8 GPA, a 1300 SAT score, and a history of volun-
teering for charity. Claire has a 3.8 GPA, a 1300 SAT
score, and won several student science competitions.
The committee finds the choice difficult to make, and
is unsure which applicant would be better to admit in
order to promote their values. They end the meeting
undecided. At the next meeting, they learn Claire has
taken the SAT again, and this time received a score of
1320.
In this case, it seems reasonable for the committee not to
treat the extra 20 points of the SAT score as a tie-breaker. It
would be rational for them to still find it hard to choose be-
tween the two applicants, even after the additional “sweet-
ening” of the higher SAT score.
If the committee remains unconvinced by the extra 20
SAT points, then the options B admitting Bridget and C ad-
mitting Claire could not have been equally good to begin
with. Moreover, assuming they generally prefer applicants
with higher SAT scores, the committee’s valuation will fail
to be negatively transitive. Where C+ is the option of ad-
mitting Claire with an additional 20 points on her SAT, the
committee does not prefer C+ to B, and they do not prefer
B to C, but they do prefer C+ to C. Therefore, at least some
of the values at issue in hard admissions choice — namely,
student success, intellectual achievement, community, and
diversity — must be incommensurable.
The incommensurability of the values in hard admis-
sions choice is a problem for building a similarity metric
for individually fair college admissions. As argued above
(section 3.3), similarity metrics require prior moral judg-
ments regarding what makes for task-relevant similarity.
Accurate moral judgments must track the underlying val-
ues in the case. A similarity metric for the applicants to
Fancy New England University requires aggregating the val-
ues of student success, intellectual achievement, and com-
munity. Thus, building a similarity metric for this case re-
quires moral judgment about aggregating these values. For
instance, it must determine whether an applicant who will
improve diversity and community is similar to another who
will increase intellectual achievement. However, if the moral
values in question are incommensurable, then there can be
no accurate judgment that allows for a precisely quantified,
real-numbered aggregation of these values into a similarity
metric.
Suppose we attempted to build a similarity metric that
included Bridget, Claire, and Claire + 20 points. Since the
committee was having difficulty deciding, and were rational
in not having a preference, we assume that d(B,C) ≈ 0.
Since the committee was also rational to be undecided be-
tween B and C+, d(B,C+) ≈ 0. In contrast, a small dif-
ference in SAT score makes for a small but significant differ-
ence in similarity distance. Furthermore, d(C,C+) must be
much larger than d(B,C); otherwise, it wouldn’t be so obvi-
ous that Claire + 20 points is preferable to Claire. However,
any plausible set of assignments which respects these pro-
portions will violate the triangle inequality requirement on
distance metrics: d(C,C+) > d(B,C) + d(B,C+). Thus,
if there are incommensurable values that must be respected
for achieving fairness, it won’t be possible to build the sim-
ilarity metric needed for IF.9
Bechavod, Jung, and Wu (2020) appeal to similarity mea-
sure that is not a distance metric, one learned through appeal
to human arbiters. Thus, the problem raised above for dis-
tance metrics, involving the triangle inequality, will not ap-
ply. However, the similarity measure learned by Bechavod
et al.’s method still assigns real-valued outputs to similar-
ity between individuals. This will cause the proposal to run
into similar problems to those incommensurability causes
for real-valued utility functions. For a real-valued distance
function to accurately reflect the underlying moral values,
it must be possible to aggregate these values in a straight-
forward way. This straightforward aggregation is necessary
for evaluating each individual, so that they can then be com-
pared to each other. If the values are incommensurable, this
won’t be possible. Any real-valued distance function will in-
variably misrepresent incommensurability, as it will imply
the existence of a set of commensurable values which can
be straightforwardly aggregated into a common measure.
Responses to Incommensurability Value incommensu-
rability is not a problem explicitly considered in the individ-
ual fairness literature. Philosophers have attempted to pro-
vide alternative decision theories that allow for parity and in-
commensurability (Gert 2004; Hare 2010). However, these
alternatives face significant difficulties, as they require the
denial of very plausible principles regarding the relationship
between expected value and actual value (Bales, Cohen, and
Handfield 2014; Schoenfield 2014). For example, they deny
a principle Schoenfield calls Link: “... If you are rationally
certain that neither of the two options [A or B] will bring
about greater value than the other, it’s not required that you
choose A, and it’s not required that you choose B” (Schoen-
field 2014, p. 267). Schoenfield points out that one alterna-
tive decision theory which potentially escapes this difficulty
is described but rejected by (Hare 2010), which he calls def-
erentialism. It is unclear how this theory would be applied
to building a similarity metric, but this is a potential option
for future research.
9Dwork et al. (2012) suggest in a footnote that their definition of
fairness only requires d to be a function that satisfies d(x, y) ≥ 0,
d(x, y) = d(y, x), and d(x, x) = 0. In that case, d would not
need to be a metric. However, several of their proofs do rely on
the triangle inequality, and they use metrics for d throughout the
paper. Moreover, the use of metrics for similarity is important for
the learning methods proposed by Ilvento (2020) and Gillen et al.
(2018). Moreover, as noted below, the use of a real-valued function
will likely still lead to difficulties in the face of incommensurable
values.
Another potential response would be to eliminate the use
of a similarity metric or any real-valued function. Instead,
IF could appeal to a partial-order ranking of individuals in
terms of similarity. This idea is promising, and I intend to
explore it in future research. However, the proposal faces im-
mediate hurdles. For one thing, such a ranking would only
be able to offer weaker constraints on treatment. A metric
is a fine-grained representation that reflects the magnitude
of individual differences. Rankings made with partial order-
ings would be much less fine-grained. In the hard admis-
sions choices case, the similarity ranking would be forced to
rank Bridget, Claire, and Claire + 20 points as tied. More-
over, a ranking like this would involve some distortion of the
similarities. After all, Claire + 20 points is a better applicant
than Claire (given her record initially).
4 Discussion and Conclusion
We raised four arguments against individual fairness. The
arguments each give support for two conclusions: first, that
individual fairness does not provide a definition of fairness
that captures the intuitive notion; and second, that IF meth-
ods should not be given priority over, or used in isolation
from, other fairness methods. Moreover, the argument from
incommensurability suggests that there are cases in which
current IF methods will be completely inapplicable. In cases
involving incommensurability, building a similarity metric
that accurately reflects task-relevant moral values will be im-
possible.
What is fair about individual fairness, then? I have not
argued that IF will never be useful in promoting fairness.
Plausibly, the motivating principle behind IF, similar treat-
ment, is required for fairness in many cases. At the very
least, clear violations of similar treatment provide evidence
that the algorithmic decision-making in question is unfair.
This suggests that individual fairness should be treated as
one tool among many for diagnosing unfairness. Satisfaction
of IF, at least for tasks that don’t involve incommensurable
moral values, provides defeasible evidence that the decision-
making was fair. This evidence may be overridden in light of
other evidence, e.g., unexpected violations of group fairness
criteria. The idea of pairing IF with statistical parity condi-
tions was discussed from the beginning of the research pro-
gram by Dwork et al. (2012). In that paper, putting group
and individual fairness together was treated as a secondary,
less desirable option. However, Zemel et al. (2013) provide
a more irenic proposal that treats the two methods as equally
important. Along with (Binns 2020), I think this idea of us-
ing the methods together should be standard. At the same
time, tasks for use with IF must be chosen carefully. More-
over, methods for learning similarity measures from human
arbiters must be undertaken with caution given the existence
of systematic human bias.
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